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Abstract
Judgments of task-specific, expected performance (i.e., self-efficacy) can
affect the activities one chooses to pursue and the extent of effort devoted to
these activities. However, relatively little is known about the accuracy of self-
efficacy judgments or their effects on behavior, performance, and perceptions of
performance in complex cognitive tasks. The results of a pilot study and
experiment indicate that initial, "first-impression" self-efficacy judgments made in
cognitively complex tasks are biased towards overestimates of personal ability
(i.e., "overconfidence"). The experiment manipulated performance expectations
to illuminate how overestimates of initial self-efficacy affect decision processes,
performance, and perceptions of performance. Inducing positive expectations
produced overconfidence in choice accuracy, but did not increase effort,
attention to strategy, or performance relative to mildly negative and strongly
negative expectations. In contrast, inducing mildly negative expectations
increased effort, attention to strategy, and performance relative to strongly
negative expectations. The results suggest that the demotivational effects of
initial negative expectations are more robust than the motivational effects of
initial positive expectations. In addition, inducing mildly negative expectations
may improve performance more than positive expectations in at least some tasks
and settings.

How accurate are initial judgments of task-specific, expected performance
(i.e., self-efficacy)? How does perceived self-efficacy influence effort, performance
and perceptions of performance? Social cognitive theories (e.g., Bandura, 1986;
Locke, 1991) have begun to explore the processes underlying the self-regulation
of behavior. In contrast to theories that posit unidirectional, deterministic effects
from environmental influences or internal dispositions on behavior, social
cognitive theories posit "triadic reciprocal causation" (Bandura, 1986), in which
behavioral, cognitive, and environmental influences interact and mutually
influence one another. The shift from deterministic, unidirectional theories
towards dynamic, bidirectional theories of sociocognitive functioning has
increased attention to self-referent processes (Locke, 1991). More recently,
social cognitive research has focused on the linkages between judgments of
personal capability or "self-efficacy" and task performance. Judgments of self-
efficacy are estimates of one's ability to attain a certain level of performance in a
specific task (Bandura, 1977, 1986). Relatively little is known about the
characteristics of self-efficacy judgments (Gist & Mitchell, 1992) or their effects on
behavior, performance, and perceptions of performance in cognitively complex
tasks (Cervone, in press).
While many information sources affect self-efficacy judgments (Bandura,
1977), comparisons with others are among the most important influences
(Bandura, 1986; Festinger, 1954; Goethals & Darley, 1977; Suls & Miller, 1977).
Such comparisons are a primary influence on self-efficacy judgments because
most human activities do not provide objective, nonsocial evidence of
performance (Bandura & Jourden, 1991). People therefore often gauge their
expected and actual performance by comparison with that of others.
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Overconfidence and Judgments of Self-Efficacy
Judgments of self-efficacy are made under uncertainty. As a result, they
are subject to the same constraints of limited attention, information processing
capacity, and memory that characterize other decisions. Research indicates that
self-efficacy judgments are products of the same heuristics and subject to the
same biases as other judgments under uncertainty (Cervone & Peake, 1986;
Peake & Cervone, 1989; Switzer & Sniezek, 1991). While research has
established that self-efficacy judgments are the product of heuristic-based
processes, relatively little is known about the accuracy of self-efficacy judgments.
However, there is an extensive literature dating from the 1940s (e.g.,
Festinger, 1942; Frank, 1953; Irwin, 1944) that suggests a tendency towards
overly positive self-evaluations. The bias towards overly positive self-evaluations
extends across an impressive range of research paradigms, tasks, and
participants (see Greenwald, 1980, and Taylor & Brown, 1988, for reviews).
Evidence of this tendency includes recalling positive personality traits more easily
than negative ones (e.g., Kuiper, dinger, MacDonald & Shaw, 1985), evaluating
one's self more positively than others (e.g., Green & Gross, 1979), unrealistic
illusions of control over chance events (e.g., Langer, 1975), and unrealistic
optimism about future task performance (e.g., Crandall, Solomon, & Kelleway,
1955). One recent review summarizes this literature as follows:
Many researchers have studied biases in the processing of self-
relevant information and have given their similar phenomena
different names. There is, however, considerable overlap in
findings, and three that consistently emerge can be labeled
unrealistically positive views of the self, exaggerated perceptions of
personal control, and unrealistic optimism (italics in original)
(Taylor & Brown, 1988, p. 194).
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Overly positive self-evaluations also appear to be present in evaluations of
one's performance in decision tasks. Decision makers believe they perform better
than objective evidence indicates in a variety of tasks, including answering
almanac questions (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Koriat, Lichtenstein, &
Fischhoff, 1980; Paese & Sniezek, 1991), identifying words and sounds (Clarke,
1960; Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 1961), predicting horse races (Fischhoff &
Slovic, 1980), and diagnosing the malignancy of ulcers (Fischhoff & Slovic, 1980).
"Overconfidence" occurs when decision makers' beliefs about the quality of their
performance exceed their actual performance. Explanations for overconfidence
include the structural characteristics of judgment tasks (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978)
and a tendency to seek confirming, but not disconfirming, evidence (Hoch, 1985;
Klayman&Ha, 1987).
Overconfidence is a relatively robust phenomenon (see Keren, 1 991 , and
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982, for reviews), although recent research
suggests the existence of conditions in which overconfidence is lessened and
even eliminated. For example, certain types of professional training and
experience appear to be useful in eliminating overconfidence (e.g., weather
forecasters in Murphy & Winkler, 1977; financial auditors in Tomassini, Solomon,
Romney & Krogstad, 1982). Similarly, overconfidence appears to be either
greatly reduced (Sniezek & Buckley, 1991) or eliminated (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, &
Kleinbolting, 1991) when decision makers evaluate their performance over a
series of decisions rather than making evaluations of each decision. Sniezek and
Buckley (1991 ) argue that this occurs because evaluations of a series of
decisions result in greater weighting of self-evaluative reactions to one's
performance relative to other factors (e.g., self-efficacy).
Overconfidence in Self-Efficacy 4
There is evidence that self-efficacy judgments, particularly those made
prior to having first-hand task experience, may reflect overconfidence. For
example, Cervone and Wood (1992) found that participants' self-efficacy
judgments made before engaging in a complex decision making task significantly
overestimated ability relative to subsequent performance. Similarly, Bandura and
Schunk (1981) treated children with gross deficiencies in mathematics using four
different programs of self-directed learning. Before treatment, all four groups
overestimated the number of subtraction problems they could solve. After
receiving treatment and extensive performance feedback, three of the four groups
still significantly overestimated their capability at mathematics problems. Indeed,
even the pre-treatment self-efficacy judgments of severe phobics reflect
overestimates of ability (See Figure 1 in Bandura & Adams, 1977, and Figure 2 in
Bandura, Adams, Hardy, & Howells, 1980).
Although there is some evidence regarding the accuracy of self-efficacy
judgments, relatively little attention has been given to judgments of self-efficacy
made prior to having first-hand task experience. Initial "first-impression"
judgments of self-efficacy are important, since they can affect the activities people
choose to pursue (Bandura, 1986), the extent of effort devoted to these activities
(Cervone & Peake, 1986; Cervone & Palmer, 1990), and subsequent self-efficacy
judgments (Cervone & Palmer, 1990). One procedure for measuring
overconfidence in self-efficacy judgments is to use a percentile rank measure that
incorporates explicit comparisons with others (e.g., "I think I will perform at the
75th percentile"). " If there are no systematic biases towards over or
underestimates of ability, percentile rank self-efficacy judgments should be at the
50th percentile. In contrast, if initial self-efficacy judgments reflect
overconfidence, percentile rank self-efficacy judgments should exceed the 50th
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percentile. The pilot study tests the hypothesis that initial percentile rank self-
efficacy judgments reflect overestimates of ability.
Pilot Study
Method
Participants. Undergraduate students enrolled in an undergraduate
business course (n=47) participated for course credit and the opportunity to win a
randomly distributed $20 cash prize. 2 Participants were told that the purpose of
the study was to understand better how students choose colleges. They then
read a case describing a student interested in choosing a college. The case
described six attributes that the student had determined to be important (student
quality, student/faculty ratio, distance from home, total cost, school size and
percentage of faculty with Ph.D.s). Participants were told that:
[The student] believes that, while all the factors are relevant in
making the decision, some factors are more important than others.
Specifically, he thinks that factors one and two are three times as
important as factors five and six, while factors three and four are
twice as important as factors five and six.
Participants were told that the task consisted of choosing the college that
best matched these criteria from a set of eight alternatives. The experimenter
then showed an example of a multiattribute choice display using a microcomputer
and the Mouselab decision research software (Johnson, Payne, Schkade, &
Bettman, 1989). Following the demonstration, participants asked clarifying
questions about the task and the criteria. They then stated: (1 ) their expected
choice accuracy percentile rank on the task in comparison with other students
enrolled in the class and (2) how much they thought the hardware and software
they had seen would help them in making choices. Participants stated their
expected percentile rank as a number between and 100 and the extent of help
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they expected from hardware and software on a 7 point Likert-type scale. Before
asking these questions, the experimenter explained the meaning of percentile
ranks and emphasized that, by definition, half of the participants should be ranked
at or below the 50th percentile.
Results and Discussion - Pilot Study
The mean expected percentile rank was 69.6 (standard deviation, 14.9),
which is significantly higher than the 50th percentile (f(46) = 8.92, p < .001).
Thirty-seven participants (78.7%) expected to perform above the 50th percentile,
seven (14.9%) expected to perform at the 50th percentile, and three (6.4%)
expected to perform below the 50th percentile. A sign test (Hays, 1981) indicates
significantly more participants expected to perform above than below the 50th
percentile (z = 66.0, p < .001 ). Given the impossibility of 79% of the participants
performing above the 50th percentile, the results provide support for the
hypothesis that initial judgments of self-efficacy in cognitively complex tasks
reflect overconfidence.
Self-Efficacy, Behavior, and Performance in Multiattribute Choice
Social-cognitive theory posits three self-referent processes that potentially
influence behavior and performance: self-set goals, self-evaluative reactions, and
judgments of self-efficacy (Bandura & Cervone, 1983, 1986). Setting personal
goals can influence behavior by providing a benchmark for evaluating one's
performance. Self-evaluative reactions are feelings of satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with one's performance. Self-evaluative reactions influence
performance and behavior primarily when one both sets personal goals and
receives feedback about performance (Bandura & Cervone, 1983, 1986; Cervone,
in press). This suggests that the influence of self-efficacy relative to self-
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evaluative reactions is likely to be greatest in the absence of performance
feedback and self-set goals.
Existing research has studied the effects of self-efficacy judgments on
performance in a complex decision making task (Bandura & Jourden, 1991;
Bandura & Wood, 1989; Cervone, Jiwani, & Wood, 1991; Cer/one & Wood, 1992;
Jourden, 1992; Wood & Bandura, 1989). However with few exceptions (e.g.,
Switzer & Sniezek, 1991), research to date has studied the same task and setting,
in which participants manage the employees of a simulated manufacturing
business. Studying alternative tasks and settings provides important evidence on
the robustness of self-efficacy effects in complex decision making (Cervone &
Wood, 1992).
Choosing among alternatives is one of the most pervasive, and
challenging, of cognitive activities (Hogarth, 1983; Stone & Schkade, 1991).
Multiattribute choice (e.g., Payne, 1976) is a cognitively complex task that
demands both effort (i.e., working hard) and the development of appropriate
decision strategies (i.e., working smart). In such tasks, alternatives are frequently
displayed on one dimension of a matrix and attributes of alternatives on the other.
For example in Figure 1, colleges (labeled "A," "B," "C," etc.) are displayed as
columns, and the attributes of the colleges (i.e., "Student Quality," "Student/fac.
Ratio," etc.) as rows, in a matrix. One advantage of studying the effects of self-
efficacy in multiattribute choice tasks is the existence of well-defined measures of
decision processes (Klayman, 1983; Payne, 1976; Payne, Braunstein, & Carroll,
1978).
Insert Figure 1 about here
An important question related to self-efficacy is the effect of positive and
negative information about one's expected performance on self-efficacy
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judgments (Bandura & Jourden, 1991). More specifically, how might the self-
efficacy judgments of participants whose performance expectations are
manipulated differ from the self-efficacy judgments of participants in the pilot
study? Will the increases in self-efficacy of participants who expect better
performance than the pilot study participants be larger than the corresponding
decreases in self-efficacy of participants who expect worse performance than pilot
study participants? There are reasons to believe that positive information about
expected performance will have larger effects on self-efficacy than negative
information. For example, there is evidence that people process and recall
positive information about themselves more easily and efficiently than negative
information (Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Kuiper & MacDonald, 1982; Kuiper et al.,
1985). It may therefore be the case that positive information about one's
expected performance leads to larger increases in self-efficacy than the
corresponding decreases associated with negative information about expected
performance.
Historically, self-efficacy theory posited that people who believed that they
would perform a task well exerted more effort, persevered longer, and performed
better than those who thought that they would fail (Bandura, 1977, 1982, 1986;
Eden, 1990). As a result, researchers generally argued for the existence of
symmetric performance effects from positive and negative self-expectations.
Positive self-expectations were hypothesized to increase performance, and
negative self-expectations to decrease performance, through mediating effects on
effort and perseverance.
However, most of the evidence supporting a symmetric relationship
between expectations and performance examined cognitively simple tasks (e.g.,
solving anagrams, simple addition, typing). More recent research suggests that
the effects of self-referent processes in cognitively complex tasks may
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qualitatively differ from those found in simple tasks (Cervone, in press; Cervone &
Wood, 1992). In cognitively simple tasks, immediate performance feedback
confirms the existence of an unequivocal, positive relationship between effort and
performance (Bandura & Jourden, 1991). As a result of this unequivocal
effort/performance relationship, positive expectations induce greater effort that
immediately and directly improves performance. In contrast, performance in
cognitively complex tasks depends upon both working hard (i.e., greater effort)
and smart (I.e., attention to strategy development). In cognitively complex tasks,
working harder and smarter does not necessarily translate into immediate
performance improvements. The lack of direct performance feedback may
therefore change the influence of self-referent processes on decision processes
and performance in cognitively complex tasks.
There is some evidence that overconfidence increases with task difficulty
(Clarke, 1960; Nickerson & McGoldrick, 1965; Pitz, 1974). Overconfidence may
therefore be larger in cognitively complex than simple tasks. If judgments of self-
efficacy overestimate ability in complex cognitive tasks, decision makers who
expect to perform well are unlikely to increase their effort or attention to strategy
in tasks that lack immediate, unequivocal performance feedback . After all, why
work hard if you expect superior performance and receive no feedback that
contradicts this expectation (cf. Bandura & Jourden, 1991)? Providing information
that induces positive performance expectations is therefore likely to increase
post-decision perceptions of, but not actual, performance relative to providing
information that induces mildly negative and strongly negative performance
expectations. Inducing positive expectations should therefore increase
overconfidence but not task performance.
Research by Sniezek and colleagues provides support for the argument
that positive performance expectations may induce overconfidence without
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concomitant increases in effort or performance. Trafimow and Sniezek (in press)
led decision makers to believe they would either perform well or poorly in
answering general knowledge questions. Participants who believed they would
perform well did no better at answering questions but were significantly
overconfident. In contrast, participants who expected to perform poorly were
neither over nor underconfident. Switzer and Sniezek (1991) provided
participants engaged in a text editing task with either high or low performance
expectations. Participants who received high performance anchors believed they
would perform better at the task and exert more effort. However, they neither
correctly transferred more sentences nor executed more keystrokes than
participants who expected to perform poorly.
Information that induces mildly negative expectations (e.g., expecting only
"average" performance) may increase effort, attention to strategy, and
performance by increasing the perceived challenge of tasks (cf. Csikzentmihaiyi,
1990; Csikzentmihaiyi & LeFevre, 1989). In contrast to the overconfidence
induced by positive expectations, mildly negative expectations may increase the
perceived importance of exerting effort and attending to strategy development.
However, strongly negative performance expectations may decrease the
perceived benefits of exerting effort, since there is little benefit from working hard
at a task in which one expects to perform poorly regardless of one's effort (cf.
Bandura & Jourden, 1991; Sarason, 1975; Sarason, Sarason & Pierce, 1990).
Mildly negative expectations should therefore improve task performance by
Increasing effort exerted and attention to strategy, while strongly negative
expectations should decrease task performance by decreasing effort and attention
to strategy.
Research suggests that inducing negative performance expectations can
reduce and even eliminate overconfidence (Trafimow & Sniezek, in press). Mildly
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negative expectations may eliminate overconfidence because decision makers
outperform their initial expectations as the result of exerting effort at the task.
Strongly negative expectations may eliminate overconfidence as the result of the
self-fulfilling effects of negative performance expectations on effort. More
specifically, strongly negative expectations may lead to decreased effort which
results in low performance that matches one's initial low expectations.
An experiment was designed to test the following hypotheses: (1) the
increase in self-efficacy of participants given positive information about expected
performance will be larger than the corresponding decrease in self-efficacy of
participants given negative information about expected performance, (2)
participants given positive expectations about their performance will have higher
perceived performance than participants who are given mildly and strongly
negative performance expectations, (3) participants given mildly negative
performance expectations will use more effective strategies, exert more effort,
and, as a result, make more accurate choices than participants given strongly
negative performance expectations and, (4) participants given positive
performance expectations will be overconfident (i.e., perceived will exceed actual
performance), while participants given mildly and strongly negative performance
expectations will be neither over nor underconfident.
Experiment
Method
Procedure. The experiment took place one week after the pilot study.
Undergraduate students from the same class and semester as the pilot study
(n=139) participated for course credit and the opportunity to win one of five
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randomly distributed $20 cash prizes. None of the participants in the experiment
participated in the pilot study.
Initial procedures were identical to those described in the pilot study
through the demonstration of the multiattribute choice display. Following this,
participants listened to a 10 minute presentation by the author designed to
manipulate their expected task performance. They then responded to the same
two questions as participants in the pilot study. These questions asked: (1) their
expected choice accuracy percentile rank on the task in comparison with other
students enrolled in the class and (2) how much they thought the hardware and
software would help them in making choices.
Subsequently, participants moved to a different room where they were
greeted by a proctor who was unaware of the purpose of the experiment. This
proctor seated participants at computer terminals. Participants then made 13
choices of colleges (1 practice and 12 actual) from choice sets containing 8
alternatives (i.e., colleges). Following this, participants completed a post-
experimental questionnaire. Participants completed the task in groups of 8 to 13.
Each session required, on average, 50 minutes.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three expectation
conditions. In the positive expectation condition
,
participants were told that the
software they would use to choose colleges was an advanced decision support
system designed to Improve the accuracy of their choices. They were told that as
a result of using the software, if they worked hard, their choice accuracy would be
better than 90% of previous research participants. In the mildlv negative
expectation condition
,
participants were told that some of the other participants
would be using an advanced decision support system designed to improve the
accuracy of their choices. However they would use software that was not
designed to improve decision making, "because the advanced decision support
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system is not available to us today." They were also told that, by working hard,
they would do better than 50% of previous research participants. In the strongly
negative expectation condition , participants were told that most of the other
participants would be using an advanced decision support system designed to
improve the accuracy of their choices. However, they would use software that
was not designed to improve decision making, "because the advanced decision
support system is not available to us today." They were also told that, by working
hard, they would still do better than 10% of previous research participants.
In reality, all participants used the Mouselab decision research software,
which collects data on decision processes. The software did not provide any
decision supportive capabilities. Because the experimental manipulation involved
deception, participants were told, and given an opportunity to ask questions
about, the true purpose of the experiment and the software at the end of the
semester.
The levels of percentile ranks used for the manipulation were based upon
those given by participants in the pilot study. The positive and mildly negative
expectation condition levels (90th and 50th percentile) were approximately
equidistant from the average self-efficacy of the pilot study participants (69.6).
The strongly negative expectation condition level (10th percentile) provided a
symmetric percentile rank relative to the difference between the positive and
mildly negative conditions (i.e., 90 - 50 = 50 - 10).
A potential problem with manipulating performance expectations is that
differing performance expectation might invoke self-evaluative reactions among
participants. For example, if participants expected to perform well but received
feedback that suggested they had performed poorly, then dissatisfaction with
performance could influence subsequent behavior and performance. Social
cognitive theory posits that both personal goals and knowledge of one's
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performance are necessarily to fully activate self-evaluative reactions (Bandura &
Cervone, 1983, 1986; Cervone, in press). To lessen effects from self-evaluative
reactions, participants were not asked to state personal performance goals and
were not provided with feedback at any time during the experiment. A second
procedure intended to lessen effects from self-evaluative reactions was that
participants were told they could expect to do well or poorly based upon an
external reason (i.e., the quality of the software that was provided to them) and
not based upon their personal abilities or characteristics (e.g., intelligence,
computer skills, etc.) (cf. Trafimow and Sniezek, in press).
Data Collection. Using Mouselab, alternatives are displayed as one
dimension of a matrix, and their attributes on the other (see Figure 1 ). When a
choice set first appears on the screen, the information about the alternatives is
"hidden" in boxes. These boxes can be "opened" to reveal their contents by using
the mouse to move the cursor into a given box. Only one box can be open at a
time. Participants make choices by moving the cursor to the choice box of the
desired alternative and clicking a mouse button. Figure 1 illustrates the
experimental display after a box has been "opened." The data collected using
Mouselab includes the sequence of boxes opened, the time spent in each box,
and the choice made by a participant.
Two dimensions of the information display were counterbalanced: the
presentation order of the twelve choice sets and the order of alternatives within a
choice set. Counterbalancing was between-participants. A fractional factorial
design was used to select combinations for counterbalanced factors (Hays, 1981).
Choice Accuracy. The alternatives in each choice set were ranked from
best to worst using the criteria given in the case. For example, the best
alternative in a choice set received a rank of 8, the second best a rank of 7, and
the worst a rank of 1 . Absolute choice accuracy was computed as the average
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choice quality ranking of each participant's chosen alternatives across the 12
choices. This measure was then converted to a percentile rank relative to other
participants (e.g., average absolute choice accuracy of 6.5 equaled the 58th
percentile). Data analysis used the percentile rank measure to permit
comparisons with participants' expected and post-experimental perceived choice
accuracy.
Decision Process Measures. Two broad indicators of decision strategies
are measures of information search and measures of cognitive effort (Payne et
al., 1978). Two measures of the selectively of information search are the: (1)
variability in time spent per alternative and (2) variability in time spent per
attribute (Klayman, 1983; Payne, 1976). The variability in time spent per
alternative (attribute) measures the extent to which decision time is focused on a
few alternatives (attributes) versus spread across all alternatives (attributes). It is
computed as the standard deviation of the time spent per alternative (attribute)
across the set of attributes (alternatives). Cognitive effort was measured as the
total time required to make a choice.
Accuracy of Self-Efficacy Judgments. The pilot study measured the
accuracy of self-efficacy judgments relative to the characteristics of percentile
ranks. The experiment measured the accuracy of both pre- and post-
experimental self-efficacy judgments: (1) relative to the characteristics of
aggregated percentile rank measures (as in the pilot study), and (2) by comparing
self-efficacy judgments with actual task performance by individuals.
Debriefing Questionnaire. Upon completing the experiment, participants
stated: (1) their choice accuracy percentile rank on the task in comparison with
other students enrolled in the class and (2) the extent to which the hardware and
software they used helped their decision making.
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Analysis. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) and two-tailed t tests were used to
evaluate the data. Post-hoc comparisons were made using the Tukey HSD test
(Hays. 1981).
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Checks. Significant differences exist in the expected
percentile ranks of all three groups (see row 1 of Table 1 ). The expected
percentile rank of the positive expectations group was 88.8, the mildly negative
group, 56.3, and the strongly negative group, 31.3. The direction of the
differences in expected percentile ranks were therefore consistent with the
experimental manipulation. The expected percentile rank of participants in the
positive condition was not significantly different from the percentile rank value
(i.e., 90th percentile) provided in the experimental manipulation (f(46) = -0.91, p =
.19). However, the expected percentile ranks of participants in the mildly (^(44) =
2.31, p = .03) and strongly negative {t{46) = 5.85, p < .001) conditions exceeded
the values (i.e., 50 and 10) provided in the experimental manipulation.
Insert Table 1 about here
Significant differences also exist in participants' beliefs about how much
the hardware and software would help them in the experimental task (row 2 of
Table 1). Consistent with the experimental manipulation, participants in the
positive expectations group believed they would receive more help than
participants in the mildly and strongly negative conditions.
Comparison of Self-Efficacy Judgments with Pilot Study. The first
hypothesis states that the increase in self-efficacy of participants given positive
information about expected performance will be larger than the corresponding
decrease in self-efficacy of participants given negative information about
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expected performance. The fact that the self-efficacy judgments of participants in
the positive expectations group were equivalent to the manipulated value (i.e.,
90th percentile), while the self-efficacy judgments of participants in the mildly
negative expectations group exceeded the manipulated value (i.e., 50th
percentile) provides some support for larger increases in the positive expectations
group. To more formally test the hypothesis, 69.6 (the mean expected percentile
rank for the pilot study participants) was subtracted from the expected percentile
ranks of the positive and mildly negative expectation condition participants in the
experiment. The sign of this measure was then reversed for participants in the
mildly negative expectations condition. Positive numbers therefore indicate
changes in the direction of the experimental manipulations, i.e., > 69.6 for positive
expectation condition participants and < 69.6 for mildly negative expectation
participants. Negative numbers indicate changes in the opposite direction from
the experimental manipulations, i.e., < 69.6 for positive expectation condition
participants and > 69.6 for strongly negative expectation participants.
The changes in self-efficacy of participants in the positive condition were
larger than those of participants in the mildly negative condition (f(91) = 1.98, p =
.05). The average change in self-efficacy in the positive expectation condition
was 19.2, in the mildly negative condition it was 13.3. To better understand why
the changes in self-efficacy of positive condition participants were larger, the
number of participants in the positive and mildly negative conditions whose
expectations were greater and less than 69.6 was computed (see Table 2). There
were significantly more participants in the mildly negative condition (1 1/45 =
24.4%) whose expectations were greater than 69.6 than participants in the
positive condition (2/47 = 4.3%) whose expectations were less than 69.6 (X^ =
49.1
, p < .01 ). The results therefore support the hypothesis that, relative to the
expectations of participants in the pilot study, the increase in self-efficacy in the
Overconfidence in Self-Efficacy 18
positive expectation condition exceeds the decrease in self-efficacy in the mildly
negative condition.
Insert Table 2 about here
Choice Accuracy and Cognitive Effort. Participants in the mildly negative
expectation condition made better choices and took longer to choose than
participants in the strongly negative expectation condition (see rows 3 and 4 of
Table 1 ). Positive expectation condition participants had accuracy and effort
measures that were not significantly different from the other conditions. The
mean accuracy percentile rank was 56.4 for mildly negative condition participants,
52.7 for positive condition participants, and 41.1 for strongly negative condition
participants. Participants in the mildly negative expectations condition averaged
126.1 seconds to make choices, positive expectation participants averaged 111.5
seconds, while strongly negative expectation participants averaged 87.9 seconds.
Information Search. Higher variability in time spent per alternative (r= .22,
p < .01 ) and per attribute (r = .22, p < .01 ) was positively correlated with choice
accuracy. Greater selectivity in information search therefore was associated with
higher choice accuracy. Participants in the mildly negative condition had higher
variability in time spent per alternative and per attribute than participants in the
strongly negative condition (see rows 5 and 6 of Table 1 ). As with measures of
performance and effort, the variability in time spent per alternative of participants
in the positive expectation condition was not significantly different from that of
participants in the other conditions.^
Post-experimental Measures. Consistent with previous research
demonstrating the persistence of expectations (Cervone & Palmer, 1990), post-
experimental measures of perception closely followed expectations. Significant
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differences exist in the perceived accuracy percentile ranks of all three groups
(row 7 of Table 1 ), with the positive expectations group perceiving the highest
percentile rank (80th), the mildly strongly negative group next (55th) and the
strongly negative group last (32nd). Differences consistent with expectations also
exist in the amount of help participants believed they received from the hardware
and software they used (row 8 of Table 1 ). Participants in the positive
expectations group continued to believe they received more help from the
hardware and software than participants in the mildly negative and strongly
negative conditions.
Accuracy of Self-Efficacy Judgments. The mean expected and post-
experimental percentile ranks across conditions were 58.8 and 55.4, respectively.
Both the expected {t{^38) = 3.42, p < .001) and post-experimental {t{^38) = 2.33,
p = .02) percentile ranks were significantly higher than the 50th percentile,
indicating significant overall overconfidence in both expected and post-
experimental self-efficacy judgments. There was no significant change in mean
overall self-efficacy between the expected and post-experimental judgments
(f(138) = 0.12, p = .91).
The expected and post-experimental perceived percentile ranks exceeded
the actual percentile rank for participants in the positive expectation condition
(expected vs. actual (f(44) = 7.89, p < .001), actual vs. post-experimental
perceived (f(44) = 5.91
,
p < .001 )). The data therefore support the existence of
overconfidence in the positive expectation condition. In contrast, the actual
percentile rank was marginally greater than the expected and post-experimental
perceived percentile ranks for participants in the strongly negative condition
(expected vs. actual (f(46) = -1.82, p = .08), actual vs. post-experimental
perceived (f(46) = -1 .72, p = .10). The data therefore provide weak evidence of
underconfidence in the strongly negative expectation condition. There were no
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significant differences between expected and actual performance (f(46) = -0.03, p
=
.97) or between actual and perceived performance (f(46) = -0.40, p = .66) for
participants in the mildly negative condition.
Relationships among Expected, Actual and Perceived Performance.
Expected and perceived performance were significantly and positively correlated
(r= .82, p < .01), as were, to a lesser extent, perceived and actual performance (r
=
.17, p = .05). In contrast, expected and actual performance were uncorrelated (r
=
.09, p = .28).
Decision Processes as Mediating Variables. To what extent do changes in
cognitive effort and decision processes between the experimental groups account
for the choice accuracy results? To demonstrate a mediating relationship
between the expectation manipulation, cognitive processes, and decision
performance, it is necessary to establish three conditions: (1) that the expectation
manipulation affects processing, (2) that the effort and processing measures are
correlated with accuracy, and (3) that the effect of expectations on choice
accuracy is weakened or eliminated if processing measures are used as
covariates (Baron & Kenney, 1986).
The previous analyses demonstrate that the expectation manipulation
affects both cognitive effort and decision processes, satisfying condition 1
.
Measures of time to choice (r = .36, p < .01 ), and variability in search by
alternatives (r= .22, p < .01) and by attributes (r= .22, p < .01), are correlated
with choice accuracy, fulfilling condition 2. The third criterion for mediation was
examined by computing ANCOVAs with processing measures as covariates.
Since time to choice and the variability in search measures were highly
correlated, only one processing measure was used in each of three ANCOVAs.
The effect of the expectation manipulation was not significant in the presence of
time to choice as a covariate (F(2,136) = 1.3, p = .27). Thus, the effect of
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expectations on choice accuracy is fully accounted for by the differential cognitive
effort expended under differing expectation conditions. The effect of the
expectation manipulation is significantly weakened in the presence of information
search covariates (variability in time spent per alternative (F(2,136) = 2.5, p =
.08), variability in time spent per attribute (F(2,136) = 2.7, p = .07)). The impact of
expectations on decision performance therefore is partially accounted for by the
differences in information search under differing expectation conditions. In
summary, the results indicate that expectations affected choice accuracy through
the mediating influences of cognitive effort and information search.
General Discussion
This is the first study to demonstrate that self-referent thought can affect
decision processes and performance in multiattribute choice tasks. Changes in
initial self-efficacy affected the decision processes of participants, which in turn,
affected decision performance. Further, the results of the mediation analysis
provide evidence in a new task and context that the effects of self-efficacy on
performance operate primarily through the mediating influences of cognitive effort
and information search. The task, and the measures of self-efficacy and decision
processes used in this research differ substantially from those used in previous
research. The results therefore provide important evidence on the robustness of
both self-efficacy influences on decision making, and on the role of effort and
strategy in mediating the relationship between self-efficacy and performance.
The results of both the pilot study and experiment indicate that in
cognitively complex tasks that lack feedback, self-efficacy judgments tend towards
overconfidence. In the pilot study, the initial self-efficacy judgments of
participants were overconfident relative to the defined characteristics of percentile
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ranks. In the experiment, both initial and post-experimental measures of self-
efficacy were overconfident relative to the characteristics of percentile ranks. In
addition, relative to the self-efficacy of participants in the pilot study, the increase
in self-efficacy of the positive expectation condition participants in the experiment
exceeded the decrease in self-efficacy of the mildly negative condition
participants, which suggests greater resistance to decreases than increases in
self-efficacy. However, overconfidence was eliminated relative to actual
performance in the mildly and strongly negative conditions of the experiment by
explicitly inducing low self-efficacy compared with participants in the pilot study.
Interestingly, although overconfidence was eliminated in both the mildly
and strongly negative expectation conditions, the task performance of participants
in the mildly negative condition exceeded that of participants in the strongly
negative condition. One problem observed in previous manipulations intended to
reduce overconfidence is that reducing overconfidence can also decrease task
performance (e.g.. Experiment 2 in Trafimow & Sniezek, in press). The strongly
negative expectations condition replicates this result. In the strongly negative
expectations condition, overconfidence, task performance, and effort decreased
relative to the mildly negative expectations condition. Reducing overconfidence
without simultaneously reducing task performance therefore appears to be a
gentle art. More specifically, performance expectations must be decreased
without inducing the sometimes accompanying self-defeating belief that effort is
irrelevant to performance.
The finding of overconfidence in self-efficacy judgments provides additional
evidence supporting the argument that overly positive self-evaluations are
relatively common in human cognition (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Interestingly
however, prior to Cervone and Wood (1992), research in self-efficacy that
addressed the issue had observed that self-evaluations were relatively accurate
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(e.g., Bandura & Adams, 1977; Bandura et al., 1980). One reason for the finding
of accurate self-efficacy judgments in early self-efficacy research may be that in
the few studies that examined the accuracy of self-efficacy judgments, participants
were severe phobics who judged self-efficacy in phobia-relevant tasks (i.e., snake
handling). It may be the case that phobics' self-efficacy judgments in phobic-
related tasks are relatively accurate, while those of nonphobics (i.e., most people)
often overestimate self-capability.
In the experiment reported herein, there was no significant overall change
in self-efficacy between the initial and post-experimental judgments. However,
perhaps if participants had received feedback on the accuracy of their judgments,
at least post-experimental overconfidence would have been eliminated. Cervone
and Palmer (1990) studied the effects of feedback on the efficacy judgments of
participants engaged in a problem-solving exercise in which all participants
received performance feedback. The experimenters provided some participants
with randomly assigned performance expectations, other participants did not
receive experimenter-assigned performance expectations. Initial self-efficacy
judgments predicted subsequent levels of self-efficacy for participants who
received randomly assigned performance expectations. However, initial and
subsequent self-efficacy judgments were uncorrelated for participants who did not
receive experimenter-assigned performance expectations. Participants who did
not receive experimenter-assigned expectations therefore made greater use of
available feedback. While Cervone and Palmer did not explicitly study the
accuracy of self-efficacy judgments, one interpretation of their findings is that
feedback may be useful in improving the accuracy of self-efficacy judgments, if
one has little confidence in one's initial self-efficacy judgment. If low confidence
in one's self-efficacy judgment is a necessary condition for learning from
feedback, then effectively using feedback to gauge one's performance may
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require a malleable sense of self-efficacy. While researchers have argued the
benefits of consistent and unchanging self-perceptions (e.g., Wood & Bandura,
1989), self-efficacy research has given less attention to the potential for rigid self-
perceptions to circumvent learning (cf. Einhorn, 1980; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978).
It may be necessary to reinterpret some previous self-efficacy research
considering the issue of overconfidence. For example, Eden and Kinnar (1991)
used a special training program to increase the self-efficacy of Israeli Defense
Force (IDF) draftees. The manipulation was successful in increasing the rate of
volunteering for IDF special forces. However, the only dependent variable in the
study was a commitment to perform a future act (i.e., serving in the special
forces). Without objective measures of draftee performance, it is impossible to
say whether the manipulation increased the draftees' overconfidence or induced
appropriate confidence. However, the robustness of overly positive self-
evaluations prior to having first-hand task experience suggests the former
explanation is more likely than the latter.
This research also provides evidence that expectations of benefits from an
innovation can affect self-efficacy, independent of any substantive benefits from
the innovation (King, 1974; Stone, 1992). In the experiment, participants' self-
efficacy changed as the result of whether they expected help from computer
hardware and software. The results therefore provide support for the argument
that the implementation of innovations offers the opportunity to simultaneously
change self-efficacy (Eden, 1990). However, participants with mildly negative
expectations performed best, which suggests that expectations of benefits from an
innovation that are either unrealistically high or low may hurt task performance, at
least in complex cognitive tasks. Similar results appear in field research. For
example, Ginzberg (1981) found that computer system users with extreme
expectations (i.e., very high or very low) of system performance used a bank
Overconfidence in Self-Efficacy 25
computer system less and were less satisfied with the system. This suggests that
realistic expectations of organizational innovations may be most effective, which
contrasts with prior suggestions (e.g., Eden, 1990; King, 1974) that positive
expectations of organizational innovations produce the greatest productivity
gains. Given the increasing reliance on information technology in work settings,
the relationship between self-efficacy and organizational innovations intended to
improve productivity and decision making is an important topic for future research
on self-referent processes (Stone, 1 992).
While self-efficacy judgments affected performance, these effects were
asymmetric for positive and negative expectations. Participants who expected to
perform well did not, but believed they did. Participants who expected "average"
performance outperformed those who expected to perform badly. Overconfidence
biases in initial self-efficacy judgments may therefore induce complacency among
those who expect to do well, but motivate those who believe they must work hard
to achieve superior performance. Similar results have occurred in response to
manipulations of the type of feedback given to decision makers. Bandura and
Jourden (1991) gave some participants engaged in a decision making task
feedback that led them to believe they had easily mastered the task. Other
participants received feedback that led them to believe they had mastered the
task through hard work. Participants who believed they had easily mastered the
task set lower goals for themselves and performed worse than participants who
believed they had worked hard to achieve mastery. The authors argue that
conditions which create "complacent self-assurance" provide few incentives for
exerting the effort necessary for attaining high levels of achievement. A
complementary explanation for the superior performance of the mildly negative
condition participants in this study is that they perceived the task to be more
challenging and therefore expenenced "flow" conditions (Csikzentmihaiyi, 1990;
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Csikzentmihaiyi & LeFevre, 1989) in which both skills and task demands were
perceived as high. If, as Csikzentmihaiyi and colleagues argue, a balance
between perceived skills and challenges often produces the highest levels of
involvement and performance, the presence of overconfidence in self-efficacy
may mean that moderating overly positive self-evaluations with mildly negative
expectations may actually improve performance under certain conditions. It may
therefore also be true that, contrary to suggestions in prior research, mildly
negative self-appraisals enhance performance relative to overly positive self-
appraisals under certain conditions.
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Footnotes
'' There is considerable variability in the methods used to assess self-
efficacy (Gist & Mitchell, 1992). Some researchers argue that multiple, sequential
measures should be used to measure both the strength and magnitude of self-
efficacy (e.g., Locke & Latham, 1990). However, there is some evidence that
multiple, sequential measures may be redundant (e.g.. Wood & Locke, 1987) and
may introduce systematic biases (Peake & Cervone, 1989). Other researchers
have used single, well-defined measures (e.g., Cervone & Peake, 1986) or
responses to a set of Likert-type scales to assess self-efficacy (e.g., Bandura,
1977; Hill, Smith, & Mann, 1987; Schunk, 1983, 1984).
2 A cash prize was offered to increase the rate of participation. In both the
pilot study and experiment, participants were (correctly) told that cash prizes
would be randomly distributed and that task performance would not affect their
chances of winning.
3 There were no significant differences due to expectation condition in the
search pattern (F = 1
.4, p = .26) or the percentage of information searched (F =
2.2, p = . 1 1 ) (See Payne, 1 976 for a description of these measures).
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Table 1
Results of Experiment
Means and Standard Deviations by Expectation Condition
Positive
(n=47)
Mildly
Negative
(n=45)
iiiun
Strongly
Negative
(n=47)
Manipulation Checks
1
.
Expected Accuracy
Percentile Rank
88.83
(9.0)
56.3b
(18.3)
31.3c
(24.7)
2. Expected help from
hardware and software
5.63
(1.3)
3.8b
(1.7)
4.0b
(1.8)
Performance. Effort, and Information Search
3. Actual Accuracy
Percentile Rank
52.7
(30.1)
56.43
(28.2)
41. lb
(26.7)
4. Time to Choice 111.5 126.13 87.9b
(39.5) (66.3) (39.8)
5. Variability in Time
Spent Per Alternative
6.0
(2.8)
7.23
(4.6)
4.6b
(2.3)
6. Variability in Time
Spent Per Attribute
5.8
(2.5)
6.33
(3.9)
4.7b
(2.3)
Post-ExDerimental Measures
7. Perceived Choice Accuracy
Percentile Rank
79.53
(13.5)
54.5b
(17.2)
32.3c
(25.7)
8. Perceived Help from
Hardware and Software
4.83
(1.5)
2.8b
(1.9)
3.2b
(2.0)
F(2.136)
115.0 <.01
17.2 <.01
3.7 .03
6.8 < .01
6.8 < .01
3.2 .05
69.1 <.01
15.5 <.01
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
3' b- c Entries within a row with different letters are significantly different according to a Tukey
Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) test (p < .05).
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Table 2
Results of Experiment
Number of Participants by Actual Expectations and Expectation Condition
(Positive and Mildly Negative Conditions Only)
Expectation Condition
Positive Mildly Negative Total
Actual Expectations:
Expectation > 69.6 45 11 56
Expectation < 69.6 2 34 36
Total 47 45 92
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